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Whose Patient Am I, Anyway? 
How new economic threats co conunuiry of care can undermine the doctorlpanenr 
relationship.• 
Samuel Gorovirz 
New structures for the financing and delivery of health care and serious efforts to 
control costs all create tensions in the relationship between doctors and patients and 
heighten the need for clarification of that relationship. These tensions are well known 
and have been extensively addressed in the professional and popular literature. Nearly 
a decade ago, discussing the implications of various methods of paying physicians. Alex 
Capron emphasized 0the continuing importance of ethical precepts in protecting as 
much of the old norms of medical practice as possible."1 Now, the conflict is often 
palpable between the welfare of patients and economic factors. Thus, in a recent 
newspaper announcemenc of his retirement from practice in Santa Fe, Dr. Luis 
Bernardez wrote, "Times have changed, as has the practice of medicine; from art and 
science to a 'health industry'. So it's time for me to move on . ... "2 In the words of Arnold 
Reiman, "Health care has become commercialized as never before, and professionalism 
in medicine seems to be giving way to enrrepreneurialism."3 The conflict between 
caregiving and economics also encompasses the exclusion of the uninsured and great 
anxiety about future health care costs and quality even among the well-insured. 
We all wanr to maintain the traditional sense of a personal, caring, intimate, 
privileged, stable, and trusting relationship between doctor and patient, but we know 
that economic incursions into that relationship threaten to male it a thing of the past. 
At present, it rypilfies the best of medical care, and serves as an important model even 
in those contexts in which it is not fully realized, such as in total institutions like the 
military or prisons, or for those who receive most of their health care as walk-ins co 
emergency rooms. One increasing lament is that even in the best of settings, however, 
the relationship between doctors and patients is under assault from risk managers and 
practice managers, insurance company accountants, and other nonprincipals involved 
in the organization and financing of health care, but not directly involved in its 
provision. This issue is explored well in Ruth Macklin's probing lx>ok about threats to 
the quality of care, which concludes with the observation that Has the professional 
autonomy of doctors is weakened, so too is their ability to advocate vigorously for their 
patients' interests. "4 
Malpractice suits are also a factor, of course, raising costs, distorting decisions, and 
introducing a pernicious undercurrent of suspicion and fear into the doctor/patient 
relationship. Further, conflicts of interest intensify as the economic stakes for doctors 
rise with respect to opportunities as well as risks. For example, physicians with a vested 
interest in facilities to which they refer patients betray those patients when they make 
referrals which are not medically indicated. Such physicians may even believe that they 
only make medically indicated referrals, but the human capacity for self-deception is 
massive, and excessive referral is frequent. As Marc Rodwin notes in his extensive 
exploration of the conflicts of interest that can cloud medical decisions, "'Medicine 
*An earlier draft of the following text, which is still undergoing development, 
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today is practiced in a marlcer environment, which already disposes physicians to th.int 
of their own welfare. There is a need to balance this trend and to guard physicians frotn 
being influenced by self,servi.rag incentives which may affect adversely the patient. "i 
My focus here, however, is on one specific incursion into health care that is Uttle 
noted : the distortion of the relationship between physician and panenr that can result 
from economic disputes among the providers themselves, espectally where one disputing 
provider is the treating physician and the other is an institut ional provider which controb 
the organizational context wicllln which treatmem is received. This problem is illumi. 
nated by four recent lawsuits. 
lnC. v. P., the plaintiff was Dr. C.6 Hisparient had bronchial pneumonia and multiple 
orbital fractures of the right eye. Dr. C. refused to discharge the patient from the hospital 
when the insurance company's care manager - ai pediatrician in another state who had 
not seen the patient - said he must. Dr. C. held that for chis particular patient, DRGs, 
nonns, and statistics notwithstanding, the discharge would be premature and contr'al)· 
to the patient's welfare. Nonetheless, the patient, who had been insured for twenty years 
through his employer, was informed that his coverage would be discontinued and that 
if he stayed in the hospital, it would be at his own expense. Dr. C. was then dropped from 
the insurer's roster, his relationship with the patient abruptly severed. He sued the 
insurer P, et al.; the case settled out of court with undisclosed terms. Here, the conflict 
was between one physician serving as a provider of care and another serving as a limiter 
of care in behalf of a skillfully designed complex of corporate strnctures that insulated the 
hospital and the insurance company from various kinds of liability. 
The AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, in its statement of the Principles 
ofMedical Ethics ( 1989) , included a number of provisioru that seem especially pertinent: 
4.04. In a situation where the economic interests of the hospital are 
in conflict with patient welfare, patient welfare takes priority. 
5.01. Physicians practicing in prepaid plans or HMOs are subject to 
the same ethical principles as are other physicians . 
8.07. If a conflict develops between the physician's financial interest 
and the physician's responsibilities to the patient, the conflict must be 
resolved to the patient's benefit. 
It is hard to square these unambiguous affirmations of principle with the experience 
Dr. C.'s patient had. Such principles are not externally imposed on the medical 
community; they reflect the profession's sense of itself as a calling, and they arise from 
the internal values of the profession. Neither are they purely internal to the profession; 
they are fashioned in awareness of the values of the larger social context that has 
established and sustained the profession, and which empowers it. 
Admittedly, there are important distinctions among the physician, the hospital, the 
care manager, the insurance company, and others. These distinctions are significant in 
litig:ation, but not in the patient's experienced reality of illness and hospitalization. From 
the patient's perspective, the physician is the principal determiner and organizer of care, 
and the patient typically thinks of him or herself as the patient of a specific doctor, not 
of a medical practice corporation or other collective entity. 
This sense of the importance of being the patient of a particular physician was salient 
in the case of Scheer v. Entel.7 Alan Scheer, a clinical radiologist, left Georgetown 
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Universiry Hospital and moved to Pinellas Counry. Florida. where he worked under 
contract co a medical practice corporation of which he was an employee but not an equicy 
parmer. No complaincs were voiced abouc his clinical competence, but he wasn't a 
rainmaker, aggressively working rto expand the practice. He was abruptly fired one day, 
cue off summarily from those he considered co be his patients. He sued the physicians who 
were parmers in the corporation. 
Ac trial, the plaintiffs attorney presented evidence that the firing was based solely on 
the corporation's desire to replace Dr. Scheer with a more profitable employee. The 
abrupt severance of his relationship with his patients had caused him co appear co have 
behaved in ways that are ethically unacceptable. Some of his patients had even arrived 
ac the clinic for appointments with him only to be told that he was gone and that his 
whereabouts were unknown. 
He seemed to have disappeared, abandoning his [patients. His abrupt departure not 
only invited but mandated the speculation - if not the conclusion - thac he was guilt)' 
of some significant failure or defect. Many patients complained - "But he was my 
doctor." As one patient was quoted in the press as saying, "When you start wich a doctor, 
you like co finish with a doctor. "8 And Dr. Scheer complained chac they were his paciencs. 
But the clinic claimed the patients as its own, reassigning them without their prior 
knowledge or consent to other doctors. The jury found for the plaintiff; the judgment was 
$1 .85 million. 9 
If you work as a doctor for a corporation - such as an HMO, PPO, clinic, hospital, 
or managed care plan, what is the force of saying that I am your _patient and you are my 
doctor? Can the organization just assign me to another doctor for business reasons? If so, 
how does that affect the mutually possessive relationship between us? Can that 
possibiliry harm both you as a physician and me as a patient? 
Any statement of the form "x is my y" depends for its significance on what sort of 
possessive relationship is implied. These relationships can involve ownership ("That is 
my car."), familial ties ("He is my son!'), legally defined responsibilities ("She is my 
ward.") , or professionally determined obligations and privileges ("He is my client.") . We 
understand some of these relationships well and others noc well enough. If "She is my 
student," I have obligations and responsibiliti�s in respect to her, and she has entitle# 
ments from me. These are very different from what is entailed when a car is mine, or a 
child, or a spouse. What, then, is the force of saying that a doctor is my doctor? And what 
is the force of a doctor•s claim that I am her patientr 
In Kalamazoo, Michigan, Dr. H. sold his private practice to X Research, Inc., a 
corporation owned by a local hospital, which then invested in the practice, sought to 
expand it under his medical directorship, grew discontent about its growth rate, and, to 
his astonishment, one day fired him abruptly in a manner analogous to what had 
happened to Alan Scheer. X claimed the patients, reassigned them, and sent Dr. H. 
packing. He sued, a,chieving a satisfactory outrofrcourt settlement in Spring 1992. 10 In 
preparation for trial, Dr. H. 's attorney gathered letters from patients who expressed their 
own sense of betrayal. He was my doctor, not some corporate entity, they complained. 
Many of them were not even aware of the relationship between his practice and X. 
And in June, 1992, the case of Floyd Bryan, a vascular and general surgeon, went to 
trial in Orlando, in Federal Disttict Court. 1 1 Bryan's hospital privileges had been revoked 
at Holmes Regional Medical Group's hospital in Melbourne, Aorida, the defendants 
claimed, because he was an oftrwarned, disruptive influence within the staff. He 
acknowledged irascibility in defense of high standards of care, and a wealth of testimony 
supported the claim that he was a fine surgeon who fought aggressively within the 4
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hospital for bener - although sometunes less profitable - rrearmenc of panems. The 
jury found for the plainnff, with a judgmenc m excess of S4. l 8 mi.Ilion plULS remstate­
ment.11 
Dr. Bryan was a feiscy and sometimes initating barcler m defense of his pauencs. What 
emerges from these vanous cases, however, is a croubhng picture of some physicians 
fighting harder over patients, in behalf of the health care corporations they represent, 
than they do far patients. 
The Bryan case is of particular interest in that it highlights growing conflict between 
hospitals and physicians. The defendants have appealed the jury's verdict, and an amicus 
brief for the defense has been filed by the American Hospical Association and the Florida 
Hospical Association. Bue a brief for the plaintiff has been filed by che American Medical 
Association and the Florida Medical Association, which, while acknowledging the 
imponance of protecting the rights of hospitals to make autonomous judgments about 
the disciplining of medical staff, nonetheless sees the case as sufficiently unusual and 
important co justify its exceptional en cry on the plaintiffs behaU. Each understands that 
pan of whac is at stake is the distribution of authority for making decisioru about che care 
of patients. 
Those who are nostalgic for the good old days of medical care often miss a more 
personal, informed, and caring relationship between doccors and pacients than whac is 
common today. But anocher change may deserve atcention - loss of collegial rapport 
between doctors and the hospitals or other collective settings in which they work. The 
conflicc between Dr. Bryan and HRMG may be extreme, but the issues are noc unique 
to that case. Thus, citing hospital/physician relations as "a constraint to health reform," 
Jeff Goldsmith writes, in a recent issue of Health Affairs, that: 
Physicians crave order but despise authority. Long deprived of their 
power to influence directly the operac:i.ons of hospitals or medical 
schools, physicians have resorted to guile and guerilla warfare co win 
their battles. While many physicians ... believe that their medical 
training endowed them with superior management judgment, most 
are incapable of submitting to the authority of anyone, even a fellow 
physician .... many lack che interpersonal skills or civility co function as 
part of a larger enterprise .... They passively resisc initiatives that they 
cannot overtly oppose .... will agree in public meetings and then 
subvert privately ... .ln short, they are terrible employees.13 
Yee, increasingly, physicians are employees. As a recent front page story in The New 
York Times notes, "Worried doctors across che country are selling their offices to investor 
owned public companies," for which they then work, as Dr. H. worked for X.14 Noting 
that "Critics warn of putting profit ahead of care," the article concludes by quoting one 
economic analyst's conjecture thac "this is just the beginning of the corporatization of 
physicians." Such powerful trends will inevicably change the ways in which doctors and 
patients interact. 
The large judgments and settlements obtained in the cases cited here exert another 
upward pressure on healch care costs. They are noc malpractice judgments; no com, 
plaints abouc clinical competence are involved in any of them. But che conditions that 
give rise to such litigation undermine doctor,patient relationships. 
To be a good patient - not good in the sense of compliant and accepting, but in the 
deeper sense of being effective in advocating and defending one's own interests in the 
contexc of medical care -requires a keen awareness of what patients should tell and ask 
cheir physicians. 15 Now, a new question emerges: If you become my doctor, in what sense 5
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will you be TTlJ doctor? What will that relationship mean for each of us, and how is ic 
constrained by your obligations to others? Will 'JOU care for me when I am in medical 
need, or might I one day find myself wondering, "Whose patient am I, anyway?" 
These issues should be considered explicitly by the medical community and the rest 
of us who care about that communicy as a social institution of the first importance. We 
know chat patients may legitimately expect certain general standards to be met by their 
doccors, such as adherence co canons of confidential icy, and that doctors are barred from 
abandoning patients in their care. Bue little is dear abouc entitlements to continuicy of 
care. 
New requirements of advance disclosure may be needed to specify the limitations of 
che relationship between doctor and patient within each context of care. The �ibilicy 
of and explicit conditions for imposed reassignments should be acknowledged a't the time 
a patient begins any association with an organizational provider, but this standard of 
disclosure has not yet been generally accepted. 
One health plan recently sent me its promotional literature, including a section 
headed .. Answering Your Questions." It reads, "Q. Will I have my own physician? A. 
Absolutely! ... the physician chosen by you becomes your physician .... we offer personal 
care m a  personal setting." There's no hint of any limitations on this personal relation, 
ship; I suspect this is typical. Neither is there disclosure of the ways in which decisions 
jointly made by doctor and patient may be constrained by the mechanisms of managed 
care. I suspect that this too is typical. It is therefore incumbent on doctors to make dear 
what arrangements are in place for alternate coverage, and to inform their patients about 
the possibility of reassignment - insofar as that possibility is understood by the doctors 
themselves. 
It is also important to understand the diagnostic impact of continuity in the doctor­
patient relationshilp. If, as has been argued, diagnostic efficacy is facilitated by trust, 
familiaricy, and awareness on the part of the physician of how the present state of the 
patient fits into an on,going pattern of who and what this patient is, then continuicy of 
relationship has value for diagnostic strategies. Whatever undermines that continuity, 
and the crust and familiarity it sustains, incurs a cost in diagnostic efficacy. 
The diagnostic and therapeutic value of such continuity is the primary basis of 
objections to the Clinton health reform proposal as discussed by Emanuel and Brett in 
a widely reported essay. Calling "the interaction between patient and physician ... the 
final common pathway through which reforms will be played out," they emphasize that: 
Conscientious physicians provide quality medical care by learning 
about their patients' particular reactions to their diseases, their social 
support systems, their tolerance for pain and disability, the effect of 
illness on their work and interests, and their general values and 
preferences regarding medical care. Physicians obtain this sort of 
information and understanding gradually by interacting with patients 
and their families over long periods of time, not by assembling 
d "16 recor s .... 
These matters do not just involve bureaucratic arrangements attendant to the 
provision of medical care. They raise fundamental questions about medicine as a calling, 
challenging our understanding of the relationship between doctors and patients and 
necessitating a refinement of our understanding of the relationship between physicians 
and society. 
It was reported in June 1993 that American Medical Association lawyers "have laid 
the groundwork for an aggressive legal and political campaign against ... limits on national 6
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spending for health care and on doctor charges. "17 The conceptual basis of thac campaign 
is the notion that the practice of medicine is "a property right, procecced by the Fifth 
Amendment." This argument may seem to have more force here, where mosrt physicians 
incur heavy debts in pursuit of medical education, than in other countries - where 
medical education is publicly supported as an invesanent in the public good. Yee it is 
unconvincing. 
The right to practice medicine is not generally enjoyed as a right of citizenship. It is 
granted only in the context of a complex social institution - the enterprise of medical 
care - and then only to specific persons based on their satisfaction of demanding 
criteria. The licensed physician then enjoys remark.able privileges, and undertakes 
remarkable responsibilities. The granting and acceptance of that license constitute a 
social compact that is subtle, complex, and not nearly as explicit as would be desirable 
in these tumultuous times. Certainly, the ability to practice medicine depends on being 
the beneficiary of much scientific, technical, and clinical knowledge developed at public 
expense; that fact. along with the complex pattern of privileges and obligations, makes 
"property rights" a suspect analogy for the practice of medicine. 
The concepts of propeny, its uses, and the benefits of its ownership, are the 
foundational concepts underlying the existence, purpose, and functioning of corpora. 
tions. The concepts underlying health care as a social institution have historically been 
very different, emphasizing healing, service, and fiduciary agency. Thus, Pellegrino 
emphasizes that: 
Ultimately, we must place our oust in the person of the physician .... We 
must be able to trust her to do what she is trusted to do, Le., to serve 
the healing purposes for which we have given our trust in the first 
place .... We must trust also that our vulnerability will not be exploited 
for power, profit, prestige, or pleasure .... Trust must be engendered 
and built up gradually by fidelity to promise from the first moments of 
a professional relationship. 18 
As these two very different cultures - that of the corporation and that of the healer 
- come closer together and increasingly intersect, trust becomes more fragile and 
conceptual conflict is inevitable. In a period of such instability in the various relation­
ships among doctors, patients, payers, institutional providers, and public policy, we 
should be especially wary when concepts central to one of these two cultures, such as the 
concept of property rights, are invoiced to provide explanations or justifications for 
decisions central to the other culture. 
Just as the relationship between doctors and patients is undergoing challenge and 
change, so is the r,elationship between doctors and the society that sanctions and sustains 
the enterprise of medical practice. Not all those changes - of either kind - are in the 
interests of patients. Thus, a recent interdisciplinary project on the quality of caring in 
medical care (at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences at 
Stanford) focussed its agenda at one session with the question "Why aren1t doctors nicer 
to their patients ?." There was vigorous debate about the most persuasive answer, but 
none about the appropriateness of the question. All agreed, however, that the structural 
context within which medicine is practiced is an even more powerful factor than the 
training and motivation of the physician in determining whether the doctor/patient 
relationship will be a caring one. (f wo reports from that project are pending publication; 
"Organizational and Economic Aspects of Caring," and "The Caring Physician in the Era 
of High Technology Medicine." Information is available from the Center; Stanford, CA 
94305.) 
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ln clarifying both the doccor-patient relationship and the doc'tor-society relationship, 
we need as much underscanding as possible of the particulars of what happens co people 
in the cone ext of medical care, and of how what happens depends not only on what 
doctors and patients do, but on what is done by the many others who influence the 
relationship berween doctors and patients without being part of it themselves. 
Those particulars are essentially human particulars, which cannot be understcxxi, 
except superficially, on the basis of any array of data about frequencies, recovery rates, 
costs, rrend lines, averages, nonns, or anything else. Such information, albeit useful and 
often necessary, is limiced by a sterility which obscures the personal stories tha.c alone can 
convey a sense of what it is like to be a patienc in a given situation, or whac it is like to 
try to practice good medicine within a specific set of complex and unwelcome con­
straints. Yee what it is like - in chose very human terms of anxiety, trust, terror, hope, 
frustration, and confidence - is what most powerfully motivaces the decisions that 
people make as pacients and as health care providers.19 Similar motivations will largely 
shape our reactions to health care reforms chat are proposed and implemented. At the 
heart of that experience of medical care, the relationship between doctors and patients 
is at once both powerful and fragile. And at the core of that relationship, at its best, is 
the confident knowledge that a particular physician is one's own -not as is a restaurant 
waiter on a given evening, nor as is a spouse over the years, but something between, 
continuing with a commianent chat we need co clarify. 
• Earlier versions of this paper were presented to :meetings of the American Urological 
Association, the Department of Medicine at Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, 
and the Deparanent of Psychiatry at the SUNY Health Sciences Center in Syracuse. I 
thank participants in chose discussions for many helpful comments chat prompted 
subsequent revisions. 
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